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MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY ADJUSTHENT IN INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES

Richard Cooper
Yale University

•

This paper is concerned with the gains to be derived from coordination
of economic policies, ahd with how those gains vary according to the degree
of economic interdependence.

It attempts to extend the discussion of

economic policy formation in an open economy in two respects, by allowing
for international capital movements and by exploring how well national
policy-makers, acting independently, can be expected to perform as the
economic interdependence among countries increases.
Interest in these probiems derives from two sources.

The first is the

great increase in international capital movements which took place after
1958, and the high sensitivity of some of these capital movements to in
terest rates.

This change put new burdens and new restraints on national

monetary policies.

Analysis of the economic interactions among countries,

such as i.1etzler's classic paper [7], has generally been confined to trade
flows, ignoring capital movements entirely.

Those works which have in

corporated the effects of international capital movements have been fraxned
in terms of an "atomistic" country, one sufficiently small that the
repercussions of its policies on the world economy, and hence back on
itseif, are negligible. 1

This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis,

but it•does so at the expense of relevance for a large economic area such
as the United States, the European Economic Community, or the United
Kingdom.
The second source of interest is the evident increase in international
consultation and cooperation which has accompanied growing economic in
terdependence among nations, a growing interdependence that appears in
trade flows as well as capital movements.

2

Why have these developments

-2apparently increased the pressure for international economic cooperation?
The question is especially pertinent in view of the observation by
Mundell [10.] that when national economic authorities have several policy
objectives and several policy instruments at their disposal, a division
of labor can be found which will permit attainment of the objectives. 3
In a decentralized system of policy-making, each policy authority concen
trates his attention on a single policy objective.

I·1undell' s proposal

concerns the division of labor between monetary and fiscal policies within
a single country, but the "division of labor 11 principle would seem to be
even more appropriate, and is certainly more evident, among countries; the
same analysis should apply, and decentralizatio n of policy-making should_
be successful. Close cooperation among policy-makers should be unnecessary.
The analysis here attempts to show that as economic interdependence
increases, the effectiveness of decentralized policy-making in the sense
just described will decline, and the case for coordination of policy-making,
for directing all the policy instruments at all the targets, becomes more
compelling.

This conclusion is perhaps obvious and innocent enough as

applied to policy-makers within a single country, but it also has implica
ticms for the c;oordination of economic policies among nations, with a
,corresponding reduction in national sovereignty, which are only beginning
to be appreciated.
The analytical framewo~k used here is similar to that introduced by_
J. Tinbergen [13], involving targets of economic policy, i.e. variables to

which we attach some social importance, such as the level. of unemployment
or the rate of economic growth; and instruments of economic policy, i.e.
those variables, SUGh as government expenditures or open market operations,
which can be controlled by a nation's economic authorities, and which in

-3turn influence the values taken by the target variables.

11

Effectiveness 1' of

policy is measured both in terms of the speed with which policy-makers·restore
the target variables to their target values after they have been disturbed
by some exogenous and unforeseen forces and in terms of the size of reserve
movements required during the transition period.
The approach taken here is to specify a simple two-country model of the
world economy.
disposal.

A

Each country is assumed to have two policy instruments at its

process of adjustment to deviations from policy targets is

specified, and the resulting dynamic adjustment model is simulated for
different values of the parameters--marginal propensities to impot;t and the
interest sensitivity of international capital movements--~A1ich represent the
degree of economic interdependence among countries,
I.

The Hodel

The following macro-economic relationships describe the economy of a
major country:
(1)

Y = C +I+ G + X - M

(4)

i1 = H(Y)

(7)

L = V

(2)

C = C (Y)

(5)

L = L(Y,r)

(8)

B = dR = X - M + K

(3)

I= I(Y,r)

(6)

V

(9)

K = K(r-r')

where

=

H + R

y = national income
C

= consumption

I = net domestic investment
G = government expen9iture

X = exports of goods and services
11 = imports of goods and services

L

= demand

for money

V = supply of money
·R .= central bank holdings of international reserves

-4H = central bank holdings of domestic bonds
B = balance of international payments
K = net inflow(+) of foreign capital
r = rate of interest on bonds
All of these variables (except r) are in money terms, but prices are
assumed to be constant.

4

Relationships (1), (6), and (8) are identities,

(2), (3), (4), (5) and (9) are behavioral relationships, and (7) is a
market balance equation.
For simplicity it is assumed that all government expenditures are
financed by the sale of bonds; there are no truces.

Thus there are three

assets involved here, bonds, money, and real investment.

But attention is

focused on flows, and portfolio balance considerations are ignored.
A similar set of relations (l') - (9') apply to the second region,
which can be considered to be the rest of the world, whose variables are
indicated by a prime,

Exchange rates are assumed to be fixed throughout,

and without loss of generality currencies are assumed to exchange one for
one, so we have the following identities:
(10)

X =

N'

(10')

M =

X'

(11)

K = -K'

Together these imply
(12)

B

=

-B'

Substituting (2), (3), (4), and (10) in (1) and (9) in (8), performing
similar operations on the primed variables, differentiating totally the
resulting equations, noting (12), defining s = 1 - Cy - Iy for the first
country and s' similarly for the second, and rearranging, we get five in
dependent equations (13) - (17):

-5(13)

(14)
(15)
(16)

(s + m)dY - I dr - m'dY'
r

-Ly dY
mdY
-mdY

= dG

- L dr
r

+dR = -dH

- K dr - m'dY' + K dr'

(SI + m' )dY' - I

(17)

+dR = 0

r

r

l

dr'

I

dr'

r

-Ly I dY' - L

r

,.., dG'
-dR = -db. I

Here subscripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to the indicated
variable,and the differentials can be taken to indicate differences from

*

target values, e.g. dY = (Y - Y ), where Y7t is the target value of Y.
is also assumed that B = 0 initially, so dB= dR.
only once, however.

So long as B

It

This trick will work

1 O, reserves will be changing and so

will the money supply, unless offsetting action is taken.

This formula

tion assumes therefore that the influence of past reserve changes on the
money supply are neutralized by offsetting open market operations, but
that Bt affects the money supply in the current period t.

In other words,

it is the balance of payments rather than the reserve level that is tar-;'i:

geted: B = 0, and,
t-1

(18)

dRt = dBt = Bt = Rt - (Ro+ r_Bf)
i=l

Alternative formulations that avoid this stock-flow problem5 are
to assume 1) all reserve changes are immediately neutralized by open
market operations or 2) incomes and interest rates always adjust fully
and freely to assure balance of payments equilibrium (Bt = 0 for all t).
With the first alternative dR would not appear in equations (14) and (17),
while with the second alternative dR would not appear in equation (15).
The model used here is thus a peculiar hybrid of the two alternative
models, implying that the monetary authorities choose to neutralize the
monetary effects of reserve changes, but they do so only with a one-period

-6lag.

Interest rate differentials are assumed to influence the period to - period flow of capital from one country to another.

It would be

more appropriate, but unduly complicating, to represent capital movements
as a combination of stock adjustment and continuing flow in response to
interest rate differentials.

The model assumes implicitly, therefore,

that once an investor buys .bonds he is "locked in" until maturity, so
that only new saving plus the proceeds from (steadily) maturing bonds
can be allocated between new domestic and foreign bonds in response to
yield differentials.
Equations (13) and (16) concern the flow of goods and services in
the two regions, equations (14) and (17) represent the monetary sectors
of both regions, and equation (15) is the balance of payments between
the two regions.

Thus equation (13) indicates that changes in saving

and imports must equal changes in government spending, investment, and
exports, while equation (14) indicates that changes in the demand for
money must equal changes in the supply, which in turn are made up of
changes in international reserves plus open market transactions in bonds,
It is assumed that s, m, L , and K
Y

r

are all positive, while I

r

and

L are negative (similarly for primed variables). The equations have
r
been arranged so that all the target variables (Y, r, B, Y', r') are on
the left hand side and all the policy instruments (G, H, G', and H')
are on the right hand side.
notation:
(19)

Ay =

X

This permits the use of economical matrix
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where

("fro
;I

A=

-I

r

0

-m'

0

-L r

1

0

0

m

-K

1

-m'

K

-m

0

0

s '+m'

-I I
r

0

0

-1

-L'
y

-L'
r

-L

y

r

r

y is the column vector of target variables, and xis the column vector
of policy instruments.

As we will see below, matrix notation makes it

possible to see clearly which interdependencies are being ignored in a
policy adjustment process.
Note that interest rates on bonds are here regarded as targets of
policy rather than as instruments, as they have been in some models. 6
Interest rates cannot be regarded as instruments of policy in an open
economy with international capital movements, since no country can
control directly its interest rate.

It is open market operations that

are directly under the control of each country's monetary authorities.

Interest rates can be regarded as a proxy for the target of economic
growth or the distribution of income, just as the level of income proxies
7
for the target of employment.
For example, full employment can be
achieved with various combinations of consumption and investment. Lower-

ing the bond rate can alter the "mi~•~ in favor of investment and hence
/

-8raise the growth in output.

In this sense the rate of interest may be

a proximate target of policy.

II.

Comparati ve Statics of the ,fodel

How small changes in each of the policy instrumen ts 8 affect the
equilibriu m values of each of the target variables can be found by invert
ing the matrix A, since
dy

and - - equals the transpose of A- 1 . The elements
dx
-1
of A , even for this simple system involving only two countries , four instruments , and five targets, are formidabl y complicat ed. 9

For example, the

normal foreign trade multiplie r for a change in governmen t expenditu re,
allowing for feedbacks from the other country and for monetary effects in
both countries , is
dY
(20)

where

=

dG

(L

r

- K )[(s'+m') L' + I'L'] - L [(s'+m')K
r
r
r y
r

r

- m'I']
r

t.i

=

[(s+m)L +IL J[(s'+m') L' + I'L'] - L mm'L'
r
r y
r
r y
r

r

+m'I'(sL +LI)+ ml (s'L' + L'I')
r
r
y r
r
r
.

y r.

-K [(s'+m')(s L +LI)+ (s+m)(s'L '+LfI') + m(s'L +L'I)
r
r
yr
·
r yr
r
yr

+ m'(sL'r +LI')]
y r

Given the assumptio ns concernin g signs made in Section I above, both the
numerator and the denominat or of this expressio n will always be positive. 10
It would be tedious to examine all of the elements of A-1 •

However,

allowing for internati onal capital movements between two regions does give
rise to some possible outcomes which would not otherwise take place.

We

can consider three:
First, while an autonomou s rise in domestic expenditu re would normally
be expected to hurt the balance of payments, if capital movements are

-9sufficiently sensitive to interest rate differentials a rise in domestic
expenditure by raising interest rates may attract more than enough capital
from abroad to finance the enlarged current account deficit.

The inflow

of capital serves not only to purchase the bonds issued to finance the
larger expenditure, but also to help satisfy a larger transactions demand
for cash.
Second, while a domestic boom in one country may normally be expected
to "spill over" into the other country, raising incomes there as well as
in the first country, it is possible that the flow of capital from the
second to the first country, by raising interest rates in the second country,
nay induce a decline in investment more than enough to offset the stimulus
from enlarged exports.

This outcome will be more likely the higher is

the interest sensitivity both of international capital movements and of
investrr:c::it in the second country, relative to the interest sensitivity of
c
demand for money in both countries.
Third, tighter monetary policy (open market sales of bonds) in one
country may be expected to lower interest rates in the other country if
international capital movements are small, but to raise them if inter
national capital movements are large.

The first outcome results from the

lower level of activity induced in the second country by a decline in
exports to the first country.

If capital is internationally mobile and

interest sensitive, however, tighter monetary policy in the first country
will pull funds out of the second country

and raise interest rates there.

This flow will mitigate the impact of a given open market sale on the
first country, but it will aggravate the decline in money income in the
second country.
These exe~ples should serve to indicate that allowance for inter-

nation al capita l movements introdu ces a new range of possib le outcom es
into
the traditi onal analys is of foreign trade multip liers.

It becomes espec

ially importa nt to specify the nature of the disturb ance--w hether it
is an
expend iture disturb ance (e.g. a shift in the consum ption functio n, an
investm ent boom, or a change in governm ent spendin g or taxatio n) or a
moneta ry disturb ance (e.g. centra l bank action or a shift in the public
's
portfo lio between bonds and cash).

Either type of disturb ance may have

quite differe nt impacts on incomes and interes t rates in the two countr
ies,
and on the balance of paymen ts, depend ing on the relativ e size of the
countr ies, on the relatio nship between the margin al propen sities to im
port and the interes t sensiti vity of interna tional capita l flows, on
the
relatio nship between the margin al propen sity to save and the transac tions
demand for cash, and on other factors .

III.

The Policy Adjustm ent Hodel

The precedi ng section was a digress ion on the compar ative static
proper ties of the model set out in Section I.

Nothing was said there

about the target values of the target variab les.

From the viewpo int of

policy targets , the model of Section I is underd etermin ed.

A well-kn own

propos ition of the theory of econom ic policy is that to achieve n targets
.
11
( except by coincid ence ) there must b eat 1east n instrum
ents.

Here

.
12
.
there are f ive policy targets and on 1y f our instrum
ents,
so instrum ents
set of
are inadequ ate to secure any/ar bitrary values for the five targets .
Here

we are not interes ted in reachin g arbitra ry targets , howeve r, but in
how
this model respond s to small disturb ances from policy targets which are
assumed to be compat ible.

* compat ible
He can make the five targets (y)

by manipu latin'g some parame ter not a variabl e in this model, for example

-11-

the exchan ge rate, so as to make them all compa tible.

Thus the exchan ge

rate is assume d to be correc t for the levels of employ ment,
the rates of
growth (as reflec ted in the intere st rates) , and the balanc e
of payme nts
target s of the two count ries.

Initia lly

y = y* = 0

and

x = O, by

choice of scale.
Now suppos e this harmon ious state is subjec ted to some distur
bance .
Distur bances can be specif ied in severa l ways and can enter
the system
in a number of places .

For simpl icity, howev er, we assume that the

struct ure in equati on (19) remain s unchan ged, that the param
eters remain
unchan ged as a result of any distur bance , and that distur bance
s are con
fined to once- for-al l shifts in expen diture patter ns or in portfo
lio
. eit
. her o f t he two
pre f erence s in
.
lJ
count ries.

Thus the distur bance s (z)

are step functi ons which enter the model linear ly, like the
policy instru ments:
(21)

Ay

=

X

+ z,

where z is a column vector .

It is obviou s from (21) that for y * =
value of

X

requir ed to assure y

o,

-Jc

X

=

-z, where

,"r
X

is the

"' = o.

The policy autho rities do not genera lly know the value of z. As
ing
a rule, they cannot observ e distur bance s direct ly, but result
only/d eviati ons of
target variab les from their target values .

They theref ore must

11

grope 11

back toward policy equili brium on the basis of signal s from
these devia tions.
We assume that this gropin g proces s takes the form:
(22)

x = B(y * - y), where xis the time deriva tive of x,

and Bis a "coord inatio n matrix 11 • 14

B indica tes the degree of coord inatio n

among policy -make rs in their pursu it of the target s, where coord
inatio n
refers to the extent to which policy -make rs take into accoun
t the object ives

-12and prospective actions of other policy-make rs in determining their own
actions.
1)

Three cases can be distinguish ed.

B has only one element in each column.

By rearrangeme nt of the

terms in equations (13) - (17), i.e. by rearranging the columns
of A, B can then be made diagonal.

In this case each instrument xi

is assigned to a single target yi, and adjustment takes the form:
(23)

,'c

x. = b .. (y. - y .),
l.
l.l.
l.

i = 1, ... 4

1

This is the case of no coordinatio n, or full decentraliz ation, in
economic policy making. For example, the fiscal authorities are
concerned only with the level of national income, not with the level
of interest rates or the balance

of payments.

This is the case

examined by Hundell [10] for two targets and two instruments .
2)

B (after proper arrangement of A) is block diagonal.

In this case

the policy instruments of each country are devoted to simultaneou s
achievement of the objectives of each country.

The fiscal and

monetary authorities of each country are concerned with the simul
taneous determinati on of national income and interest rates, say,
but they are not concerned with the values of these variables in the
other country.
3)

This is the case of internal coordinatio n.

B is a full matrix, identifying each instrument with all target
variables on which it has an impact.

here the policy-make rs take

into account all the interdepend encies of the economic system in
using their policy instruments .

This is the case of full coordinatio n.

It seems natural to relate the elements of B to the elements of A,
and in particular when b .. is not zero to set b .. = aa .. , where a is a
'

' ' l.J

constant coefficient of adjustment.

' ' l.J

l.J

These values can be justified on the

-13-

groun d that withi n this gener al form of adjus tment the
most direc t appro ach
to equil ibrium would be:
(24)

x = a(x

.,,
- x),

where each xis adjus ted with a speed

varyi ng with the devia tion from its (unknown) appro priate
value .

This

seems to be an obvio us stand ard for compa ring speed s of
adjus tment under
diffe rent degre es of coord inatio n.
reduc es to this if B = aA.

But the system of full coord inatio n

Thus we have:

No coord inatio n:

\

0

0

0

0

a22

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

, 8

0

0

0

0

l all
I

(25)

-,,

--

/

B = a

,....._

I

0

i

44

I

0

a55

Inter nal Coord inatio n:

/

\

/

(26)

B =

a

i

I
I

all

al2

0

a21

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

22

0

0

i

l

Full Coord inatio n:

0

0

0

44

aS4

8

45

I

\

all

8

8

al3

al4

alS

a22

8

8

a25

0

0

41

a42

8

a51

a52

8

l

(27)

B =

a

21

0
8

I

I

"ssJ

,/

!

l

12

23

24

0

0

43

a44

8

53

a54

ass

45

I

I
\

'

l

,/

-14Here a .. are the elements of A.
l.J

The zeros in the middle row merely remind

us of the fact that there is no instrume nt to operate directly on the
balance of payment s, i.e. x

3

=

O.

Substitu ting equation (21) into (22) yields
(28)

X

= By *

BA

-1

(x+z), where the z are given.

The solution to this system of simultan eous differe ntial equation s in x
takes the form:
x(t) = Ay * - z + We -At W'

and therefor e

(29)

where y(t) is the value of the target variable s at time t after the
initial disturba nce, W and W' are matric.es determin ed both by the structur e
of the model and by the nature of the initial disturba nce, and A is a
vector of the charact eristic roots of BA- 1 • If the target variable s are
to converge to their target values (y *), the second term on the right must
be transito ry, which is assured if all the roots are positive .

The smaller

these roots are, the longer the transiti on period will last and the longer
the target variable s will be away from their targets.

Thus in general

an adjustm ent system with large roots will be more efficien t than a system
with small roots.

The length of the transiti on period, defined as the

time required for y(t) - y* to reach some specifie d small value and stay
below it in absolute value, will vary with the type of disturba nce and
the structur e of the model, since these determin e the weight to be associ
ated with each root A••
l.

But a system is more efficien t with respect to

many types of disturba nce the larger is the smalles t root, since this is
the root whose term fades out least rapidly.

Thus in evaluati ng the differ

ent types of coordin ation, we are concerne d with the relative size of the
charact eristic roots of BA-1 , and in particu lar with the size of the
smalles t root.

-15-

IV.

Numeri cal Examples

Unfort unately equatio n (28) cannot be solved analyt ically, even
though it arises from a fairly simple model.

It can be solved numeri 

cally, howeve r, for particu lar values of the elemen ts in A and B.

Any

set of values is somewhat arbitra ry, but values have been selecte d here
to corresp ond very crudely to the United States (region 1) and the rest
of the world (region 2).

All of the parame ters have been fixed except

for the two margin al propen sities to import and the interes t sensiti vity
of capita l flows; these have been varied parame trically to allow for
in
creasin g degrees of econom ic interde penden ce between the two regions .
Thus the followi ng numeri cal work is based on:
.35 +m

15.

0

-m'

0

6.

1

0

0

1

-m I

K

-.10
(30)

A =

m

-K

-m

0

0

, 30 + mI

r
15.

0

0

-1

-.24

12.

·~.... ,........ .__

r

The margin al propen sities to import , m and m', were permitt ed to take
on the followi ng values in tandem, indicat ing a parall el rise in "openn
ess"
on curren t accoun t in both regions :
(31)

m =

m' =

.01

.06

.15

. 30

.007

.04

.10

.20

The intere st sensiti vity of capita l, K, was given the followi ng values
:
r
(32)

2.0

These number s, like the values for I

r

10.0
and I' in (30),
r

20.0

15

indicat es

the change in billion s of dollars per unit of time (say, a year) resulti
ng

-16from a one percentage point change in the bond rate.

Thus K = 2.0 means
r

that a one percentage point rise in r relative tor' would lead to an inflow of capital of $2.0 billion per period.

The values for K range from
r
no interest-se nsitivity of capital movements to very high (but not
infinitely high) sensitivity .
Since there are five target variables and only four instruments , a
choice must be made, for purposes of adjustment, among the target vari
ables.

It is assumed below that each of the two regions is primarily

concerned with its level of employment and its rate of growth, and each
directs its fiscal and monetary policies toward these ends.

The balance

of payments is thus left to follow the course dictated by the pursuit of
these other objectives.

Because of our assumption that all targets are

compatible, the balance of payments will also adjust as the other target
variables are_ brought to their targets.
An alternative assignment involves having one country, say the first,
direct its monetary policy to keeping pa~nents in balance, and allowing
the rate of interest to adjust residually.

Some remarks will be made

below on this case, but attention will be focused on the first case.
Table 1 gives the smallest characteris tic roots of BA- 1 , where A
is drawn from (30), (31), and (32) and Bis constructed as indicated in
(25), '(26), and (27) above.

-17-

Table 1

Smallest Characteris tic Roota of BA-l
No Coordinatio n

Internal Coordinatio n
0

20

.94

• 26

.41

.18

Full Coordinatio n
0

~-

.01

.30

20

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

-·-·-··~-~

a All systems give rise to one root at zero, but this plays
no role in the adjustment process so long as the disturbance s
do not affect the balance of payments directly, that is, so
long as z

3

= 0.

Here a. = 1.

For different a., characteris tic roots will

be the product of a. and the roots shown.
Several things stand out.

First, when policies are not coordinated

at all, there is a considerabl e amount of "over-shoot ing", as indicated by
(some not shown)
h lead to oscillatory behavior in (29).
roots,/whic
complex
of
the presence
When policies are coordinated internally, this oscillatory behavior disappears; the strong interdepend encies which when ignored led to oscillation
were between monetary and fiscal policies in pursuit of the two domestic
objectives in each region.

1'1ore~ver, the smallest root is

-18higher with internal coordination than it is with no coordination, indi
cating that convergence toward objectives will be faster when policies
are coordinated internally.

The smallest roots are still below unity,

however, indicating that convergence to targets after a dist~rbance may
· be slower with only internal coordination than it would be with full coor.
dination of policies, which takes into account the interdependencies be
tween nations as well as those within nations.

However, with internal

coordination there is also one root above unity (not shown), so f.or some
types of disturbance convergence may actually be faster t4an it would be
with full coordination.

The second point to note about the smallest roots for iptern~l
coordination is that they decline as the degree of economic interdepend
ence between the two regions increases.

This pattern suggests that as

interdependence increases, the speed with which economic policy~akers
can return to their targets after disturbance under a system cf ~djustment
which ignores the interactions between national policies will decline as
the economic interdependencies grow.

Lack of coordination becomes more

costly and the case for better coordination increases.

V.

Simulated Policy Responses

The speed of response to any disturbance depends in part on the
nature of the disturbance.

Two types of disturbance of particular interest

involve· shifts in expenditure patterns (e.g. an

II

"

autonomous

II

investment

boom or a change in government expenditure) and shifts in preferences
among financial assets.

The policy adjustment model set out in Section III,

modified to facilitate computer use, was simulated for the numerical values

-19-

of the parameters given in Section IV and for these two types of disturb
ance.

Some results of these simulations are set out in Tables 2-4 below.
The policy model used for simulation was the system of difference

equations (21') and (22') set out in footnote 14, rather than the differ
ential equations (21) and (22).

This change simplifies computation, but

it also changes slightly the nature of the solution.

The g.eneral solu-

tion to equations (21') and (22') is
(33)

where, as before, Wand W' are matrices determined both by the structure
· of the model

and by the initial disturbances and A is a vector of the

1
characteristic roots of BA- •

Here t takes on only integral values, re

presenting discrete time periods.

The second term on the right will be

transitory so long as (1->..) is less than unity in absolute value, i.e.
so long as the real part of A is between zero and two.

Thus in this case

A can be too large for stability as well as too small; indeed, if any
of the roots is greater than unity a cyclical response will be introduced;
the policy responses taken together but without coordination will lead
to overshooting the targets.

Furthermore, roots which are near to zero

or to two will lead to longer transition periods than roots which are
close to unity.

Thus, as before, the smaller the positive root, the

slower the convergence to policy targets; but here the additional possi
bility is introduced that too large roots can. also lead to slow conver
gence, as well as to overshooting.
,T.able 2 indicates the time required for national income to be put
back on target following an expenditure disturbance and a monetary
:· disturbance, under the three forms of policy coordina-

-20 tio n.

The sta nda rd of per form anc e was
tak en to be the number of tim e
per iod s req uir ed to brin g the sum
of the dev iati ons of nat ion al inco
me
(wi tho ut reg ard to sig n) in the
two reg ion s to wit hin a spe cifi
ed dis 
tan ce from the ir tar get val ues
, and to kee p thi s sum belo w tha
t fig ure .
For con cre ten ess , the ini tia tin
g exp end itur e or mo net ary dis tur
ban ce can
be reg ard ed as $20 bil lio n per
per iod , and the stan dar d of per
form anc e is
to brin g the com bine d nat ion al
inco mes to wit hin $200 mil lio n
of the ir
com bine d tar get s.
Tab le 2
Spe ed of Adj ustm ent to Income
Tar get s
(Pe riod s unt il ldYI +

l<lY'l

Exp end itur e Dis turb anc e 8
K

m

r

~ .20

Mo neta ry Dis turb anc eb

0

20

0

20

No

• 01

17

17

22

Coo rdin atio n

,30

24

16

29

Int ern al

.01

10

26

11

36

Coo rdin atio .n

.30

19

11

23

45

Ful l

•. 01

9

9

.30

9

9

C oor ;din atio n

a

zt = (20 ,0,0 ,0,0 ), t _> O

b

zt = (0, -20 ,0,0 ,0) , t ~ O

:l
10

J

-21Table 3 gives similar results for the interest rate targets, where
the measure of performance is the number of periods required to bring the
sum of the interest rates in the two countries to within .02 percentage
17
. t so f th e sumo f th e targete d rates o f interest.
poin
·
Tables 2 and 3 confirm the two generalizations made earlier.

First,

the time period required for adjustment generally rises as capital mobility
and import propensities increase, except when there is full coordination.
In general, higher interdependence tilows down policy adjustment,

Even

with internal coordination, the delay in achieving income targets follow
ing an expenditure disturbance is increased 10 per cent in moving from the
northwest to the southeast corner of the box in Table 2, for instance, and
the delay following a monetary disturbance is quadrupled. In addition, as
we will see below, larger reserves are required during the transition
period.
Second, the delay in adjustment is reduced by increasing the degree
of coordination, and the delay in adjustment from failure to coordinate
policies rises with the degree of interdependence between regions.

This

conforms with common sense; if interactions are high, the losses from
ignoring them will be larger than if interactions are low.

Table 3
Speed of Adjustment to Interest Rate Targets

(Periods until ldrl + ldr'I ~ .02)

Expenditure Disturbance

·-~-

m

No

.01

Coordination

.30

Monetary Disturbance

20

0

20

12

12

17

39

I

26

24

30

39

!

6

15

8

25

Internal

--·"t

Coordination

.30

13

7

17

34

Full

.01

6

6

8

8

Coordination

.30

6

6

8

8

a, b.

b

0

Kr

I

a

j
I

See Table 2

In addition, although it is not evident in Tables 2-3, the degree
of over-shooting targets is much greater in the case of no coordination
than in the case of internal coordination, and overshooting is absent in the
case of full coordination.

18

These generalizations are not without exception.

The tendency for

high interdependence between countries to prolong the adjustment period is
far less marked when there is no coordination than where there is internal
coordination.

This is because internal interdependencies--the influence

of monetary policies on demand and of fiscal policies on interest rates--

-23are being ignored in the first case, and for the paramet ers tested here
larger externa l interact ions apparen tly do not add much; indeed, greater
externa l interact ions sometim es compens ate in part for the ignored interna l
interact ions.
Second, higher trade interdep endence occasio nally reduces the ad
justmen t delay under the regimes of no coordin ation and interna l coordin a
tion.

High import propens ities represen t large leakages of demand, and if

these are !!2!_ quickly compens ated by fiscal or monetary action abroad, they
help to stabiliz e the disturbe d economy by transmi tting some of the disturb 
ance to the other country.

But of course this failure in both countrie s to

take into account high leakages contribu tes to the oversho oting of targets. 19
Table 4 indicate s even more clearly the impact of high but ignored
interdep endence

on the process of policy adjustm ent.

It shows the change

in foreign exchainge reserves (in billions of simulate d dollars) during the
first ten periods followin g an expendi ture or a monetary disturba nce amount
ing to $20 billion.

The choice of ten periods is wholly arbitrar y, designed

merely to provide a common basis for comparis on. 20
The case of monetary disturba nces can be consider ed first, since it
shows a straight -forwar d pattern.

A shift in portfoli o preferen ce toward

bonds and away from cash, or a series of open market purchase s of bonds
by the central bank, will lower the interes t rate, stimula te domestic in
vestmen t expendi ture, and induce a capital outflow .

A persisti ng shift in

demand for bonds will cause reserve losses which generall y decline as the
degree of policy coordin ation increase s and, for each coordin ation regime,
increase both with the interdep endence on trade and on capital account .
Moreove r, the differen ce between coordin ation regimes in the amount of re
serve change increase s with the degree of interdep endence .

Thus as inter-
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Table 4
Reserve Changes during Adjustment
(Billions of simulated dollars, cumulative
for ten periods following a disturbance)

Expenditure Disturbancea

K
m

r

0

20

Monetary Disturbanceb

0

20

No

.01

- •2

+2.9

-0.1

-71.7

Coordination

.30

-20.3

-6.8

-6.0

-74.3

Internal

.01

-0.7

+15.1

-1.6

-57 .3

Coordination

.30

-11.7

+5.7

-29.2

-74.4

Full

.01

-0.6

+5.3

-1.5

-20.8

Coordination

.30

-5. 7

-0.3

-14.3

-23.8

a, b.

See Table 2

dependence rises from (m,K) = (.01,2) to (.30,20), the conservation of
r
reserves over ten periods arising from a move to full coordination of
policies from internal coordination rises from (16.8 - 10.9) = 5.9
billion simulated dollars to (74.4 - 23.8) = 50.6 billion dollars for a
monetary disturbance of $20 billion.
Reserve changes resulting from an expenditure disturbance also show
a clear pattern, but a somewhat more complicated one than in the case of

-25a moneta ry disturb ance.

An autonomous rise in expend iture will worsen the

current accoun t, leading to reserve losses.

But it will also raise in

terest rates, leading to capita l inflows and reserve gains.

Whereas in the

case of a moneta ry disturb ance the effects on curren t and capita l accoun
ts
reinfor ce one anothe r, in the case of an expend iture disturb ance they
work
in opposi te directi ons.

As we saw in the compar ative static analys is of

Section II, a rise in governm ent expend iture (analy tically equiva lent
to
an expend iture disturb ance) can either help or hurt the balance of paymen
ts,
depend ing on whethe r the effect on capita l accoun t outweig hs or is out
weighed by the effect on curren t accoun t.

The range of possib ilities in

a dynamic contex t can be seen in Table 4.

For each coordi nation regime,

reserve change s decline algebr aically as the margin al propen sities to
import increas e, and rise algebr aically as the intere st sensiti vity of
capita l increa ses.
The fact that reserve s rise with high capita l sensit ivity offers
little consol ation to an observe r of the whole system, since a rise for
one region means a fall for the other; and an autonom ous drop in expend
i
ture in the first region will lead to a loss of reserve s by that region.
The pattern of reserve changes does sugges t, howeve r, that as far as
ex
penditu re disturb ances are concern ed for each degree of coordin ation
and
for each level of the margin al propen sities to import there is an optimum
interes t sensit ivity of capita l which minimi zes the need for reserve s.
As the margin al propen sity to import rises this optimum sensit ivity also
rises.

Either higher or lower capita l mobili ty would lead to larger re

serve change s.

Thus it is not genera lly true, as is sometim es claimed ,

that a perfec t capita l market will reduce greatly or even elimin ate paymen
ts
imbalan ces

by permit ting

11

equilib rating 11 flows of capita l.

Very high

r 1'
,.ro
.to1~-'l,.,i-J•

o,,.t

( m =· • ob~

o.r fwrr-(

cr,._~.,.,,t7,

0

h;u ,".rJ;J,,'< . ◊1 ~ lr1;r f,.:r,,..,u..,
rii':: ,01)

Kr;

z)
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interest sensitivity of capital movements may aggravate rather than miti.
21
gate ba 1 ance of payment s swings.
There is no guarantee, moreover, that
the same degree of capital mobility will also minimize the impact on re
serves arising from expenditure disturbances in the second region; 22 or
that it will minimize the time required to restore income targets; and
monetary disturbances will always result in larger reserve changes the
higher the international mobility of capital in response to interest rate
differentials.
Chart 1 compares typical reserve changes in response to an expendi
ture disturbance under the three regimes of policy coordination.

There is

a clear trade-off between reserve requirements and coordination of eco·nomic
policies, wi~h greater coordination generally reducing reserve requirements.
The results presented so far rest on a particular assumption about
monetary policy (delayed neutralization of reserve. changes), on a particular
assignment

of

instruments to targets,

values for the relevant parameters.

and

on a particular set of numerical

It is of interest to know how sensi

ti~e the results are to these various assumptions.
'
With full and immediate sterilization of the impact of reserve
.

changes on the money supply, the interes.t-sensitivity. of.. capital movements
ceases to affect the time required after a disturbance to restore incomes
and interest rates to their desired levels, since by assumption the
effect of capital flows on domestic interest rates is neutralized.

None

theless, the delays in reaching targets are lengthened by larger trade in
terdependencies, the delays decline with increasing coordination among
policy-makers, and the pattern of reserve changes is similar to that
recorded in Table 4, although the size of the swin~s is larger because of
the immediate neutralization of effects on domestic monetary conditions. 23
Thus the conc1usions above require little modification in this case.·

-27The results presented so far for the case of no coordination
(=each instrument associated with a single target) have been based on
the assumption that monetary policy should be directed toward the objective
of growth.

Alternatively, monetary policy could be assigned the task of

keeping international payments in balance.

24

In this case, broadly speak

ing, higher economic interdependence among regions speeds up the adjust
ment process rather than slowing it down.

This result is not surprising,

since the leverage of monetary policy on the balance of payments increases
with higher interdependence.

Restoration of income and growth targets

at all levels of interdependence is much slower, however, than when monetary
policy is directed toward the interest rate target.

For an expenditure

disturbance reserve requirements are diminished when the balance of pay
ro.ents is targeted; but for monetary disturbances reserve requirements
are substantially increased.
Finally, separate simulations for substantially lower values of the
marginal savings rates and the interest-sensitivity of investment, and
for higher values of the income and interest-sensitivity of demand for
money, suggest that the results reported in detail here continue to hold
qualitatively and do not change radically in magnitude except in the last
case, where raising the parameters reduces the leverage of the supply of
money on the target variables.

VI.

Conclusions from the Analysis

The model developed and simulated here has attempted to do several
things at once.

It has attempted to incorporate international capital

movements in a systematic way, to allow for normal repercussion and feed
backs between two regions roughly equal in size, to explore the effects
of coordination between policy-makers on the path of adjustment to economic

-28disturbances, and to suggest how the adjustment is affected by different
degrees of economic interdependence between the two regions on both
current and capital account.

25

It is a medium term Keynesian-type model,

abstracting from longer term adjustments in the stock of capital and
rates of return on capital,

and it assumes exchange rates are in long

run equilibrium throughout.
The numerical

examples and simulations suggest the generalizations

that
1)

lack of coordination among policy-makers
a)

delays achievement of national objectives
such as full employment and a targeted rate of growth, and

b)

increases the requirements for international reserves when,
under a regime of fixed but equilibrium exchange rates, the
balance of payments is simply allowed to adjust passively
to policy changes directed at other objectives; and

2)

these delays in reaching targets and their calls on foreign
exchange reserves are increased as the degree of economic inter
dependence among nations increases.

These generalizations are not without exception; but they seem to be
sufficiently well-founded to suggest some implications for the "real"
world of policy.

Since the need to hold foreign exchange reserves entails

a national cost, and since prolonged deviations from national objectives
of economic policy lower national welfare, growing economic interdependence
among nations calls for increased coordination between national policy
makers.

It also raises the requirements for foreign exchange reserves,

since given disturbances cause a larger drain on reserves when inter
dependencies are high even when policies are fully coordinated among coun
tries.

-29There is little doubt that economic interdepen dence among nations-
concretel y, marginal propensit ies to import and the interest sensitivi ty
of internatio nal capital movement s--has increased sharply since the
Second World War, the period in which governmen t responsib ility for the
speed and direction of national economies has become widely accepted.
Hence, the analysis here suggests a need for greater coordina~ ion of
national policies and for additiona l foreign exchange reserves- -or, alter~
natively, for steps to reduce the interdepe ndencies- -if welfare losses
are to be avoided,

Not surprisin gly, both these forces can be recog

nized in official actions during the past ten years. 26
The gains from coordinat ion of policies here are "dynamic" gains,
arising from better mutual timing.

They should not be confused with the

arguments for "harmoniz ation" of economic policies on (static) efficienc y
grounds,

Coordinat ion of policies in the sense used here would be de

sirable

under condition s of high interdepen dence even if one accepted

the view that harmoniza tion of economic policies beyond common agreement
on maintenan ce of full employment is not necessary even in a free trade
area.
As a descripti on of reality, the model developed here is deficient
in a number of respects, some of which can readily be corrected by
further work.

The model applies to only two regions rather than many.

If coordinat ion of policies takes place only within countries , many more
interactio ns will be ignored when there are many regions. Second, the
lag structure adopted here is far too simple.

The only lag allowed is

that arising from the need for policy-ma kers to grope toward their targets because they lack

direct informati on about the disturban ces.

-30Everything else adjusts instantaneo usly.

Adjustm~nt lags should be

allowed for; and these lags may differ for different instruments of
policy.
glected.

Third, portfolio balance consideratio ns have been wholly ne
In particular, internation al capital movements are assumed to

respond to interest rate differentia ls in a steady flow, with no allow
ance for a shift in stocks of private financial claims from one country
to the other.

Finally, for comparative purposes a uniform set of dis

turbances has been used throughout.

But disturbance s themselves may be

influenced in size by the degree of interdepend ence among regions or
.
.
b y t h e d egree of coor d ination
among po 1·icy-ma k ers. 27

If so, it is not

possible to say that higher economic interdepend ence among nations will
call for more coordinatio n without knowing also the impact of this
higher interdepend ence on the disturbance s.

-31Footnotes
1

See for example [41, [5], (8), {9], [10] and [13].

In (6] an attempt to

allow for such feedbacks is made for a regime of flexible exchange rates.
2

Tariffs, transportat ion costs, and other impediments to trade have declined,

and in addition there has probably been a narrowing, at least among in
dustrial countries, of differences in comparative costs.

See Cooper (2).

-JMundell has called this division of labor "the principle of market classi
fication" and I have called it the "assignment problem".(! ]

It has a for

mal analogy to the identificati on of each commodity in a general market
system with its "own" price.

4P rices
.

could be allowed to vary in this model without affecting the basic

results, so long as price changes are reversible with pressures of demand,
'
'

but to do so would complicate the model unnecessar ily.

Irreversibl e price

changes would involve non-tempora ry <listurbance s to. balance of payments
equilibrium , and these are outside the framework developed here.
5

1am grateful to Warren Smith and Jay Levin for raising questions about this
"stock-flow problem" in an earlier draft •.

6

See Hundell [9].

1"rundell modified this view J;>f interest rates in [8].

'""

71t.is of course
the level of real income, not ~oney income, which in the
short run determines the level of employment.

In, formulating the model in

terms of money magnitudes I have assumed that money wages adjust to higher
money national

income far more slowly than the policy authorities do.

-32Footnotes (continued)
8

9

or indeed any other autonomous linear disturbance.

There is a notational problem here.

See Section III below.

For small changes, the elements of

A-l indicate how each of the target variables Y, r, etc. changes with a
given change in policy, allowing all the target variables to adjust simul
taneously but holding other policy variables unchanged.

lOWith the Keynesian assumption regarding accommodating monetary policy,
dr

= dr' = O,

and (20) becomes the familiar foreign trade multiplier with

repercussions:
dY
dG

11

s'+m'
=-------(s+m) (s'+m')-mm'

Tinbergin [13].

12Actually

there are potentially six targets, since each country may have a

balance of payments target.

But such targets might be inconsistent.

We

assume here that the balance of payments targets are consistent, and therefore the number of targets reduces to five since B* = -B- If,

13To preserve t1e
1 assumption
·
h
· . ' 1 equi· 1 i· brium
.
tat
t h e initia
exc hange ra t e can
be retained throughout the analysis, it is necessary to rul~ out disturb
ances affecting the balance of payments directly, e.g. a shift in import
functions or a change in portfolio preferences between cash and foreign
b~-nds.

Such disturbances would lead to an indefinite loss or gain in re

serves, and would require a change in the exchange rate or other measures
acting directly on the balance of payments.
require that z

3

= 0.

In the notation used here, we

-33Footnotes (continued)

14

It should be noted that this form of adjustment process follows naturally

from a utility function quadratic in y; instruments are changed in propor
tion to the marginal utility of y if B represents the quadratic coeffi
cients in the utility function.

Here, however, Bis determined on the

basis of economic structure without regard to different welfare weights that
may attach to the different targeted variables,
The difference equation analogue is used for simulation in the next
section.

The system then becomes:

(22 1 )

15 A one percentage
point rise in the government bond rate is assumed to
lower domestic investment by $15 billion a year in both regions.
not seem too high when housing is included in investment,

This does

A one point rise is

assumed to lower the public's demand for (reserve bank) money, ceteras
paribus, by $6 billion in the first region and $12 billion in the second.
Finally, while a range of values is given for the interest-sensitivity
of capital, of the values chosen a flow of $2 billion perhaps comes closest
to the situation prevailing in the mid-sixties.

-34Footnotes (continued)
16

Expression (33) is derived as follows: substitute equation (21') in

(22'), which with reorganization becomes:
xt = B(y

*

Sett~g y

-1

- A zt_l)

*

t

(I - BA

= O, x 0 = 0, zt

-1

fo,
=(~,

)xt-l
t<O

t~O

xt =L~+(I-BA- 1 )+ ••• +(I-BA-l) t-~} (-BA-l)z

r:·

-1
= JI - (I - BA )
t.....

= -z

tl.
'l"e'

t -1
+ W(l-l) W z,

-1

Setting W z = W' gives (33)

Here A are the characteristic roots of BA-land Wis a matrix of character
1
istic vectors of (I - BA- ).
•'I,

This solution would have to be modified slightly for multiple roots
different from unity, but the conditions for speed of convergence remain
unchanged.

For a discussion of simultaneous systems of difference equations,

see Samuelson [11], pp. 418-429.
17

These standards of performance are of course arbitrary; the "acceptablen

deviation from target could be either larger or smaller than those chosen
here; and they should be calculated for each of the regions separately,
rather than taking the two regions together.

But these measures seem

reasonable (neither region alone can find itself farther from target than
$200 million or .02 percentage points for national income and bond rates,
respectively), and they serve to illustrate economically the relative speeds
of adjustment under different coordination regimes and interdependence
parameters.
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Footnotes (continued)
18

The roots in Table 1 suggest no overshooting in the case of internal

coordination when the adjustment process follows (21) and (22).

The use

of discrete adjustment iEriods in (21') and (22') introduces a cyclical
response pattern for a= 1, since in that case (l-;\)

<

0 for some roots not shown.

The simulations reported here used a= 1/2, which eliminates this cyclicity
for the parameters tested.
19.

root.

High values of m raise the largest characteristic

As noted above, a root above unity introduces cyclicity in the solu-

tion to equations (21') and (22').
likelihood of overshooting.

High values of m thus increase the

Here~=• 1/2 lowers the largest toot below

unity; but a= .8 would lead to overshooting form= .3, m' = .2.
20

with no coordination and high K, the arbitrary choice of ten periods
r

for measuring reserve changes seriously understates reserve requirements
because reserves swing dramatically within the first ten periods and for
a prolonged period thereafter.

21 For two
regions that are similar in the sense that mL

r

= m'L' the
r'

formal condition for an expenditure disturbance to lead to no overall
affect on the balance of payments (a worsened current account being
exactly offset by an improved capital account) is that -mL

(-mLr)

=

KrLy·

If

r

therefore K >-----,a country experiencing a boom will increase its
r
Ly
reserves at the expense of the other country.

Under conditions of very

high capital mobility, a boom,could create large payments imbalances due to "disequilibrating" capital movements.

-36Footnotes (continued)
21 (continued)
It is true, however, that monetary policy can be used to assure
external balance, and that the required monetary action will be less
the higher is K.
r
22

The condition that an expenditure disturbance in the second country

have no effect on reserves is -m'L' = K L'
r

r

Y'

on the assumption mL

r

= m'L'.
r

This is obviously different from the condition in the preceding footnote
if L' 1' L .
y
y
23

dR
dG

The condition for

= 0 in this case is the same as that given in

footnote 21.
24

This is an extension to two countries of the case considered by

Mundell [ 10] •
25

Fisher [3] has considered the question of ignored interdependence in

a more general framework.
26 F
· · 1 evi'd ence on t he growing
.
.
d epend ence an d o ffi cia
. 1 reor empirica
inter
sponse to it, see Cooper [2].
27 we are talking here about
the "exogenous" disturbances, z, not the
"disturbance" transmitted from one country to another through trade and
capital movements.

The latter are obviously influenced by the degrees of

interdependence and coordination, and such influences are included in the
simulations done here.
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